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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 The Criminal Justice Act requires courts to furnish 
legal counsel to criminal defendants “financially unable to 
obtain adequate representation.”  18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a).  
Joseph Konrad was appointed a federal defender under the 
Criminal Justice Act (CJA), based on information he provided 
in a financial disclosure affidavit.  At sentencing, the District 
Court found several discrepancies between Konrad’s pre-
sentencing report and his financial disclosure.  The court 
ordered Konrad to show cause that he was financially eligible 
3 
 
for appointed counsel.  After a hearing, the court found 
Konrad had significant funds in two individual retirement 
accounts so he was not financially unable to pay the cost of 
legal representation.  After appointing a Master to determine 
the cost of private legal representation, the court ordered 
Konrad to repay $6,000 because he was not financially 
eligible to be represented by the federal defender.   
 
 We hold individual retirement funds and jointly-held 
bank accounts can be available funds within the meaning of 
the Criminal Justice Act.  We also hold the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in ordering Konrad to repay the 
market value of his legal representation rather than the hourly 
rate paid to an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice 
Act.   
 
I.  
 The Federal Community Defender Office for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania was appointed by a 
Magistrate Judge to defend Joseph Konrad against charges of 
making fraudulent statements to the Federal Aviation 
Administration.  Konrad pleaded guilty.  As noted, upon 
sentencing the District Court noted disparities between the 
assets Konrad reported in the CJA Form 23 Financial 
Affidavit of November 15, 2010 and those in the 
presentencing report.  The court ordered Konrad to show 
cause he was financially eligible for court-appointed counsel.  
The court found Konrad failed to disclose the $258,000 value 
of his home, and only reported $50,000 in retirement accounts 
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worth $70,463.
1
  Konrad underreported his household 
monthly income by $4,300, stating his monthly household 
income was $2,500 in the Financial Disclosure Affidavit 
when it was actually $8,600.   
 
 The District Court found the $70,463 in the individual 
retirement accounts was available to pay for Konrad’s legal 
representation.  The court did not reach the question whether 
a bank account worth $34,893 Konrad held jointly with his 
wife was also available because the retirement savings 
accounts had several times the amount needed to pay for legal 
counsel.  
 
 The District Court found Konrad had financial 
resources to pay for his own defense while meeting the cost 
of the necessities of life.  The District Court ordered Konrad 
to pay for his legal representation and appointed a Master to 
determine the cost of private criminal defense counsel in this 
case.  The Master surveyed hourly rates in the relevant 
geographic area, and selected the lowest estimate, $400 an 
hour.  The Master determined the cost of Konrad’s defense 
was $6,000, based on the hourly rate and number of hours.  
Konrad appeals from that order. 
 
                                              
1
 Konrad included the cost of the mortgage and other joint 
household expenses in his affidavit, but not the value of the 
home.  The District Court found Konrad’s home was 
encumbered by a $230,000 mortgage.  Accordingly, the home 
was not an available asset. 
5 
 
II.
2
  
A. 
 The Criminal Justice Act requires district courts to 
provide legal counsel for criminal defendants charged with a 
felony when they are unable to pay for an attorney.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A(a)(1)(A).  A defendant bears the burden to prove he 
is unable to pay for the cost of representation.  United States 
v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 252 n.8 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing United 
States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608, 621 (8th Cir. 1997)).  
“Whenever the United States magistrate judge or the court 
finds that funds are available for payment from or on behalf 
of a person furnished representation, it may authorize or 
direct that such funds be paid to the appointed attorney, to the 
bar association or legal aid agency or community defender 
organization which provided the appointed attorney . . . .”  18 
U.S.C. § 3006A(f).  The Guide to Judiciary Policy Guidelines 
for Administering the CJA and Related Statutes explicitly 
recommends an evaluation of financial eligibility after the 
presentencing report becomes available “in order to make a 
final determination concerning whether the person then has 
funds available to pay for some or all of the costs of 
representation.”  7A Guide to Judiciary Policy § 210.40.30 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 
3231.  This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Reimbursement ordered under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Parker, 
439 F.3d 81, 99 (2d Cir. 2006).  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s interpretation of the statute.  United 
States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 2012).   
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(“[E]rroneous determinations of eligibility may be corrected 
at a later time.”). 
 
 “A person is ‘financially unable to obtain counsel’ . . . 
if the person’s net financial resources and income are 
insufficient to obtain qualified counsel” considering “the cost 
of . . . the necessities of life.”  Id. at § 210.40.30(a) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(6)).  The Guide instructs courts to 
“consider pertinent information contained in the presentence 
report, the court’s intention with respect to fines and 
restitution, and all other available data bearing on the 
person’s financial condition, in order to make a final 
determination concerning whether the person then has funds 
available to pay for some or all of the costs of 
representation.”  Id. at § 210.40.30(d) (“At the time of 
sentencing, in appropriate circumstances, [the court] should 
order the person to reimburse the CJA appropriation for such 
costs.”).3  “In the absence of a serious abuse of discretion, a 
district judge’s findings as to ‘availability’ of funds, if 
supported by an ‘adequate inquiry’, will not be disturbed on 
appeal.”  United States v. Bracewell, 569 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d 
Cir. 1978).  The District Court properly ordered Konrad to 
pay the cost of court-appointed counsel, because Konrad’s net 
                                              
3
 Contrary to Konrad’s assertion, no court has interpreted the 
CJA to require a finding that a defendant provided false 
information, or that a defendant’s financial condition 
materially improved or that new information became 
available to order reimbursement, nor do we. Even so, here 
the defendant failed to disclose significant assets in his initial 
affidavit, and new information regarding the value of his 
home and retirement savings accounts did become available 
in the presentencing report. 
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financial resources exceed the amount needed for the 
necessities of life.   
 
B. 
 We consider “the defendant’s personal and family 
needs and the liquidity of his finances.”  Evans, 155 F.3d at 
252 n.8 (citing Museitef v. United States, 131 F.3d 714, 716 
(8th Cir. 1997); Bracewell, 569 F.2d at 1199).  Assets are 
available when a defendant has control over or discretionary 
use of them.  Fullan v. Comm’r of Corr., 891 F.2d 1007, 1011 
(2d Cir. 1989).  The test for determining a defendant’s ability 
to pay “is whether repayment would cause such financial 
hardship as to make it impractical or unjust.”  Museitef, 131 
F.3d at 716 (citing Bracewell, 569 F.2d at 1199).  
 
1. 
  The District Court found Konrad was able to pay 
because he had $70,463 in individual retirement savings 
accounts—more than ten times the amount he was ordered to 
pay.  Konrad contends the IRAs are not liquid because of the 
early-withdrawal penalty,
4
 and cites to United States v. Lexin 
for the proposition IRAs are future income.  434 F. Supp. 2d 
836, 844 (S.D. Cal. 2006).  We do not agree that IRAs are 
future income because they are an accumulation of past 
earnings paid into the account and accrued investment 
income.  Only taxation on those earnings is deferred.  26 
                                              
4
 Early withdrawal of funds from an IRA encumbers a 10% 
penalty, in addition to normal income taxes.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 72(q).   
8 
 
U.S.C. § 72(b).
5
  Accordingly, we agree with the District 
Court’s finding that IRAs are not future income.  United 
States v. Konrad, No. 11-15, 2011 WL 6739464, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 21, 2011) (noting that other courts rejected the Lexin 
view that IRAs are future income for CJA purposes (citing 
United States v. Pani, No. 08-40034, 2011 WL 4344336, at 
*2 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 2011); In re Extradition of Patel, No. 
08-430, 2008 WL 896069, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2008))). 
 
 We consider the liquidity of assets in determining a 
defendant’s ability to pay. Evans, 155 F.3d at 252 n.8.  Assets 
may not be available “[i]f by their nature [those] assets cannot 
be timely reduced to cash and cash is required . . . .”  Barry v. 
Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding the 
defendant was unable to leverage his home equity to obtain 
legal counsel).  “Before a finding of ‘availability’ can 
properly be made, the district judge should be satisfied that, 
in ordering reimbursement in any specified amount, the 
defendant will not suffer extreme hardship as a consequence 
of being deprived of his funds.”  Bracewell, 569 F.2d at 1199. 
 
 “In some cases, liquidation of assets may be required.”  
Barry, 864 F.2d at 299 (citation omitted).  In Barry, we found 
the defendant’s home valued at $80,000 did not disqualify 
him from public counsel because evidence showed six private 
attorneys recommended by the public defender’s office 
declined to take a security interest in his house in lieu of legal 
fees.  Id. at 300.  Moreover, the defendant could not sell his 
                                              
5
 Moreover, the Second Circuit considered future investment 
income the defendant anticipated in United States v. O’Neil, 
118 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1997), finding the defendant 
ineligible for court-appointed counsel. 
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home because it was held jointly with his wife who refused to 
sell or encumber the home.  Id. at 297.  Finally, the 
defendant’s debts exceeded his assets, as he owed an $85,000 
fine to the state.  Id.  Accordingly, the defendant did not have 
funds available to meet his legal costs.  Id. at 300. 
 
 In contrast, the defendant in United States v. Fincher 
was required to sell his property, despite his wife’s dower 
interest, because the value of the property encumbered by the 
dower interest was still sufficient to cover the defendant’s 
legal costs.  593 F.3d 702, 707 (8th Cir. 2010).  Other courts 
have found defendants able to afford legal counsel because 
they held substantial equity in their property.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Simmers, 911 F. Supp. 483, 486-87 (D. Kan. 
1995) (“While the defendant’s primary asset is not liquid, the 
equity in his home is substantial . . . .  The defendant has not 
established extreme hardship in the event of the liquidation or 
mortgage of the asset.”); United States v. Bedoya, No. 89 CR. 
803, 1990 WL 194934, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1990) 
(finding the “defendant has equity value in the six unit 
apartment building”). 
 
 Konrad has not demonstrated he is unable to liquidate 
or leverage the value of his IRAs, or that doing so would 
work an extreme hardship.  Furthermore, an IRA is more 
liquid than real property, and is easily converted to cash, like 
any other investment portfolio.  IRA funds may be withdrawn 
at will, subject to an early withdrawal penalty.  
 
 We recognize that early withdrawal of funds from an 
IRA incurs a 10% penalty, in addition to normal income 
10 
 
taxes,
6
 which is a significant transaction cost.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 72(q).  But even with the 10% penalty, Konrad would retain 
$63,863 in his retirement savings account.  Konrad has not 
demonstrated that a $6,000
7
 reduction in his retirement 
savings account would work an extreme hardship.  Since 
Konrad may easily reduce his IRA assets to cash and has not 
shown liquidation would work an extreme hardship, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding these 
funds were available to Konrad for his legal defense. 
 
2. 
 Konrad has $6,007 in an individually held checking 
account and a CD, and $34,893 in a money market account 
jointly held with his wife.  Funds may be available for CJA 
purposes when a defendant is in control of the funds.  See, 
e.g., Fullan, 891 F.2d at 1011 (finding if the defendant “had 
discretionary use of the funds raised by his family and friends 
or had control of them,” under the CJA he would be “‘in no 
different a position than the defendant who has $10,000 of his 
own money to spend on appeal’”); Bracewell, 569 F.2d at 
1200 (“If monies paid on a defendant’s behalf actually belong 
to a third party, then they are not ‘available for payment.’”); 
Lexin, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (“[T]he Court concludes that to 
the extent any asset is jointly held and individually disposable 
                                              
6
 As noted, at the time of retirement, IRA withdrawals are 
taxed as income.  Early withdrawals are also subject to the 
same income taxes as the withdrawals intended under the 
program. 26 U.S.C. § 72(q). 
7
 We recognize that, with the early withdrawal penalty, 
Konrad might have a $6,600 reduction in his retirement 
savings account.  
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by either spouse without advance consent, then that spouse 
has sufficient supervision or control over that asset so that it 
is appropriately considered during the [CJA] evaluation 
process.”).   
 
The Guide directs that “eligibility should be made 
without regard to the financial ability of the person’s family 
unless the family indicates willingness and financial ability to 
retain counsel promptly.”  7A Guide to Judiciary Policy 
§ 210.40.50.  The CJA prescribes an “appropriate inquiry” 
which often necessitates a holistic review of a person’s 
financial position.  Id. at § 210.40.30(d) (counseling courts to 
consider “all . . . available data bearing on the person’s 
financial condition”); cf. United States v. Parker, 439 F.3d 
81, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Courts have utilized a broad range of 
considerations in conducting an ‘appropriate inquiry’ into 
financial eligibility under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.”); United 
States v. O’Neil, 118 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (considering 
anticipated income from a business venture).  The CJA Form 
23 Financial Affidavit requires information about the 
defendant’s spouse’s earnings and their dependents, in 
addition to information about their assets, debts and expenses. 
Although the Guide says spouses are not required to 
contribute to counsel fees unless they offer to do so,
8
 7A 
                                              
8
 Several courts have considered a spouse’s income in 
determining defendant’s ability to pay.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Barcelon, 833 F.2d 894, 897 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Other 
factors which courts have considered include. . . the 
availability of income to the defendant from other sources such 
as a spouse.”); United States v. Caudle, 758 F.2d 994, 996 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (“Talbert’s affidavit revealed that he earned $1000 
per month as a truck driver and that his wife earned $450 per 
12 
 
Guide to Judiciary Policy § 210.40.50, jointly held property 
has been considered when determining a defendant’s ability 
to pay.  See, e.g., Fincher, 593 F.3d at 707 (considering the 
property of the defendant and his wife), United States v. 
Brockman, 183 F.3d 891, 898 (8th Cir. 1999) (considering 
funds under a joint venture agreement as available assets); 
United States v. Liebler, No. 10CR313S, 2012 WL 6087791, 
at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2012) (finding the defendant could 
pay for legal costs from a bank account jointly held with his 
father); Lexin, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (finding the defendant’s 
bank account jointly held with his wife available to pay for 
his legal counsel).   
 
Funds are available when the defendant has control 
over their disposal. Fullan, 891 F.2d at 1011.  The court in 
Fullan distinguished between “assets belonging to [the 
defendant’s] family and friends” and “assets owned or 
controlled by the defendant.”  Id.  Fullan’s application for 
leave to appeal in forma pauperis was initially denied because 
Fullan’s family and friends raised $10,000 to pay for an 
appellate attorney.  Id. at 1008.  The Second Circuit reversed 
because Fullan did not have “discretionary use of the funds 
raised by his family and friends or [] control of them.”  Id. at 
1011.  “Indeed, if Fullan . . . had discretionary use . . . or . . . 
control . . . , we would agree with the district court that he 
was ‘in no different a position than the defendant who has 
$10,000 of his own money to spend on appeal.’”  Id.; see also 
                                                                                                     
month.”); United States v. Salemme, 985 F. Supp. 197, 201-02 
(D. Mass. 1997) (“In determining whether a defendant is 
financially unable to retain counsel, the court may consider 
whether he has income or assets available to him from other 
sources, including his spouse.”).  
13 
 
United States v. Zelenka, 112 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1999) (“This is not a case where Defendant has 
received assets or income from the third party payers in the 
form of a gift so that Defendant is free to control how and 
whether the assets will be spent on his defense.  Rather, the 
assets are solely in the control of a third party who may 
withdraw the funds or alter the way in which they are spent at 
any time.”). 
 
The District Court here found Konrad “does own and 
control, at least partly, the assets in the joint bank accounts.”  
Konrad, 2011 WL 6739464, at *4.  This reasoning is sound 
since a purpose of a joint account is to permit the co-signer to 
freely withdraw funds without additional consent.  At oral 
argument, Konrad’s counsel conceded that Konrad has the 
“right to . . . write a check from the account . . . and take 
money out for himself.”  Oral Argument at 15:17, Apr. 2, 
2013.  Access to jointly held assets for CJA purposes should 
be distinguished from the debtor/creditor context where third 
parties seek to seize the debtor’s funds.  The CJA analysis is 
designed to determine ability to pay future legal costs, rather 
than payment of an accrued debt. 
 
Konrad has authority to dispense funds from the joint 
checking account at his discretion.  These funds are not held 
in a spouse’s individual bank account, and Konrad can freely 
withdraw from the joint account.  As the Second Circuit 
explained, this discretionary use and control places Konrad in 
the same position as a defendant who has his own money to 
spend on counsel.  Fullan, 891 F.2d at 1011.  Accordingly, 
the funds in the joint account can be available to pay the cost 
of Konrad’s legal counsel. 
 
14 
 
Konrad has access to a sizable joint checking account, 
as well as a more modest individual account.  The checking 
accounts have several times the amount of money Konrad is 
ordered to pay.  Konrad also owns IRAs worth more than ten 
times the amount Konrad was ordered to pay, and these 
accounts may be liquidated for cash at any time.  Konrad has 
no minor children in his household, and the presentencing 
report shows Konrad’s household income exceeds his 
household expenses.  Accordingly, Konrad has sufficient 
funds available to pay for legal counsel and still meet the cost 
of the necessities of life.  The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering reimbursement. 
 
C.  
The District Court ordered Konrad to pay the cost of a 
private defense attorney, and appointed a Master to determine 
that cost.  The CJA provides for reimbursement 
 
[w]henever . . . the court finds that funds are 
available for payment from or on behalf of a 
person furnished representation, [in which case] 
it may authorize or direct that such funds be 
paid . . . to the court for deposit in the Treasury 
as a reimbursement to the appropriation, current 
at the time of payment, to carry out the 
provisions of this section.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f).  “Reimburse” means to pay back.  It is 
ambiguous whether the statute means to pay back the value 
received in legal services or to pay back the cost expended on 
the legal defense.  “Appropriation” has many meanings.  One 
meaning is the fund or sub-fund appropriated by Congress for 
15 
 
court-appointed attorneys representing those who cannot 
afford legal counsel.
9
  We read “reimbursement to the 
appropriation” to mean repayment to the institution that 
expended funds for representation in the amount of the 
benefit to the ineligible defendant.   
 
 Konrad contends he should only have to pay the $125 
hourly rate paid to court-appointed counsel, not the hourly 
rate of a private attorney.
10
  But Konrad does not contend that 
the $125 hourly rate for court-appointed private attorneys has 
any relation to the cost to the government for representation 
by the Federal Public Defenders.  Although the CJA rate is the 
amount private court-appointed attorneys are compensated, 
the CJA figure is universally recognized as a below-market 
rate for criminal defense lawyers.  The CJA rate does not 
reflect the costs to private criminal defense attorneys, nor the 
                                              
9
 The Guide provides: 
When the court determines that a person who 
received representation under the CJA was 
financially ineligible for those services at the 
time they were rendered, and directs that person 
reimburse the government, the payment should 
be made by check or money order to the clerk 
of court for deposit in the Treasury.  Such funds 
will be credited to the Defender Services 
Appropriation. 
7A Guide to Judiciary Policy § 230.40. 
10
 Private court-appointed attorneys are compensated at $125 
per hour, with some exceptions.  Id. § 3006A(d); 7A Guide to 
Judiciary Policy § 230.16.  In contrast, Federal Public 
Defenders are paid a salary independent of the CJA rate paid 
to court-appointed counsel.  18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(A).   
16 
 
cost to the government for providing a legal defense through 
the Federal Public Defenders.  Even if we read “reimburse” to 
mean pay back the costs expended for Konrad’s legal defense, 
there is no indication that the CJA rate has any relationship to 
the cost to the Federal Public Defenders.
11
  Reimbursement 
more properly refers to the money that Konrad would have 
paid to a private attorney had he accurately completed the 
financial disclosure affidavit, rather than falsifying his 
financial information.  Konrad was not entitled to a Federal 
Public Defender, so he should not be limited to the CJA 
reimbursement rate.   
 
When a defendant is able to pay for the costs of a 
private attorney, he is not entitled to gratuitous or subsidized 
legal counsel under the CJA.  Wilson, 597 F.3d at 357 (“What 
the Act gives with one hand to a criminal defendant 
‘financially unable’ to pay for legal services it takes away with 
the other if the defendant turns out to be ‘financially able’ to 
obtain counsel.”); United States v. Coniam, 574 F. Supp. 615, 
618 (D. Conn. 1983) (finding defendant would benefit from 
“gratuitous or subsidized counsel … if his reimbursement 
were limited to a level below the cost of his representation”).  
Ordering reimbursement at a lower rate than the cost of 
private representation would be contrary to the statute by 
subsidizing the cost of counsel to a defendant who is able to 
pay.  Coniam, 574 F. Supp. at 618 (“Nothing in the act 
provides nor manifests a congressional intention to subsidize a 
defendant who is clearly able to pay out of earned income.”).  
                                              
11
 Even if one could measure the proper cost to a public 
defender, it would appear that this would vary from office to 
office depending on the number of public defenders, fixed 
costs of the facility, etc. 
17 
 
Moreover, Konrad should not benefit from his incomplete, 
undervalued or untruthful financial disclosures by receiving 
legal services at a fraction of the cost. 
 
Other courts have not limited reimbursement to the 
court-appointed counsel CJA rates.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Anderson, 400 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering 
reimbursement for “the time expended in this case at a 
reasonable hourly rate (not limited to $90 per hour)”); United 
States v. Nunez-Garcia, 879 F. Supp. 63, 67 (W.D. Tex. 1995) 
(finding the court “is not limited by the hourly rates stated in § 
3006A(d)(1)”); Coniam, 574 F. Supp. at 618 (“There is no 
explicit limit on the amount of such funds to the panel 
attorney rates . . . .”); cf. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d at 621 (ordering 
defendant to reimburse $316,693.70, greatly exceeding the 
maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2)). 
 
When civil defendants pay attorney’s fees under fee-
shifting statutes, they do not pay the hourly rate earned by a 
plaintiff’s public interest attorney, but instead pay a 
reasonable market rate for a private attorney in the area.  
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984).  This is how the 
Master here calculated the cost of Konrad’s legal defense.  
The Master selected the lowest estimate submitted by private 
attorneys.
12
  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in 
ordering Konrad to pay the $6,000 cost of private legal 
representation. 
                                              
12
 Defendant’s contention the Master had a conflict of interest 
because she was compensated from the recommended 
reimbursement is unfounded.  The Master was paid the 
standard hourly rate, and not a percentage of the sum she 
calculated. 
18 
 
 
III. 
We will affirm the District Court’s order that Konrad 
pay $6,000 for the cost of his legal representation. 
1 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.    
 
I agree with the Majority’s holding that “individual 
retirement funds and jointly-held bank accounts can be 
available funds within the meaning of the Criminal Justice 
Act.”  Majority typescript at 1.  Because the Defendant, 
Joseph Konrad, failed to disclose all of his “available funds” 
before being appointed a Federal Defender, the District Court 
properly ordered him to reimburse the Government.  My 
disagreement with the Majority concerns what constitutes 
“reimbursement” under § 3006A(f) of the Criminal Justice 
Act (“CJA”).  The “reimbursement provision” of the CJA 
provides, in pertinent part:  
 
Whenever . . . the court finds that funds are 
available for payment from or on behalf of a 
person furnished representation, it may 
authorize or direct that such funds be paid . . . to 
the court for deposit in the Treasury as a 
reimbursement to the appropriation, current at 
the time of payment, to carry out the provisions 
of this section.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f).   
 
The District Court considered the following three 
methods for determining the amount of reimbursement owed 
by Konrad under § 3006A(f): (1) using the hourly rate for 
court-appointed CJA attorneys in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania; (2) structuring an hourly rate for the Federal 
Defenders, who are salaried; and (3) calculating the market 
value of the legal services Konrad received.  United States v. 
2 
 
Konrad, Criminal Action No. 11-15, 2011 WL 6739464, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2011).  Ultimately it employed the third 
method and ordered Konrad to reimburse the Clerk of Court 
in an amount equal to what it would have cost him to hire a 
private defense attorney.  The District Court reasoned that 
“[c]hoosing the CJA rate or structuring an hourly rate for the 
federal defender’s services would not be an adequate measure 
of the benefit that the Defendant received.”  Id.   
 
On appeal we have been asked to determine whether 
the methodology chosen by the District Court to calculate the 
reimbursement amount was proper.  This requires us to 
answer an antecedent question of law: what does the term 
“reimbursement to the appropriation” mean in the context of 
§ 3006A of the CJA?  The Majority Opinion affirms the 
District Court, concluding that it “did not err in ordering 
Konrad to pay the $6,000 cost of private legal 
representation.”1  Majority typescript at 14.  However, I agree 
with Konrad that the reimbursement determination should 
have been based on the amount of money it actually cost the 
Federal Defender to represent him. 
In cases of statutory interpretation “we begin by 
looking at the terms of the provisions [at issue] and the 
commonsense conception of those terms.”  Carachuri-
                                              
1
 While it is true that we review a district court’s fixing of 
compensation and reimbursement under the CJA for abuse of 
discretion, see United States v. Parker, 439 F.3d 81, 99 (2d 
Cir. 2006), we exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
interpretation of the terms of the statute, see United States v. 
Williams, 675 F.3d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 2012).  Because this 
question involves a matter of statutory interpretation, our 
standard of review is plenary. 
3 
 
Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2585 (2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  As the Supreme Court has 
emphasized, in “all” cases “[t]he inquiry ceases if the 
statutory language is unambiguous.”  Barnhart v. Sigmon 
Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Thus, we turn first to the text of the 
reimbursement provision itself, which again provides that: 
 
Whenever . . . the court finds that funds are 
available for payment from or on behalf of a 
person furnished representation, it may 
authorize or direct that such funds be paid . . . to 
the court for deposit in the Treasury as a 
reimbursement to the appropriation, current at 
the time of payment, to carry out the provisions 
of this section.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) (emphasis added).   
 
We have previously stated that the “plain and ordinary 
meaning” of the term reimburse is “‘[t]o pay back, to make 
restoration, to repay that expended; to indemnify, or make 
whole.’”  Liberty Lincoln-Mercury v. Ford Motor Co., 134 
F.3d 557, 566 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1287 (6th ed.1990)); see also Reimburse 
Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/reimburse (last visited July 24, 2013) 
(defining “reimburse” as “to pay back to someone: repay,” or 
“to make restoration or payment of an equivalent to”).  
Moreover, the word “appropriation” is defined as “money set 
aside by formal action for a specific use.”  Appropriation 
Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/appropriation (last visited July 24, 
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2013).  Thus, § 3006A(f)’s edict that a court may order 
“payment from or on behalf of a person furnished 
representation . . . as a reimbursement to the appropriation” 
plainly means that a court may order a defendant to repay the 
money that has been expended or set aside by the 
Government to pay for his representation. 
 
The problem with the “benefit” approach taken by the 
District Court is that it has no relation to the amount that it 
actually cost the Government to represent Konrad, which is 
the only thing that the reimbursement provision contemplates.  
The District Court ordered that Konrad pay $6,000 to the 
Clerk of Court, to be credited to the Defender Services 
appropriation.  See App. 8; 7A Guide to Judiciary Policy 
§ 230.40(c).  However, the Federal Defender argues that its 
representation of Konrad cost, at most, $1,875.  Appellant Br. 
at 23.  In effect, the District Court ordered Konrad to 
“reimburse” the Government for costs it never incurred.  
Having the Government profit from a court’s reimbursement 
order is antithetical to the very concept of reimbursement. 
 
I understand the Majority’s policy concern that 
limiting the amount of reimbursement to what was actually 
expended on Konrad’s behalf would allow Konrad to “benefit 
from his incomplete, undervalued or untruthful financial 
disclosures by receiving legal services at a fraction of the 
cost.”  Majority typescript at 13.  However, individuals who 
knowingly provide false or incomplete information on a 
sworn financial affidavit may be charged with perjury, a 
felony punished by up to five years in prison.  See, United 
States v. Page, Nos. 10-CR-30053-04-MJR, 10-30136-MJR, 
2011 WL 2224674 (S.D. Ill. June 8, 2011); 18 U.S.C. § 1621.  
I doubt that the desire for subsidized legal costs will drive 
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those with the means to pay for private counsel to risk a 
conviction and prison time for a randomly assigned public 
defender. 
 
 Furthermore, a number of district courts faced with 
this issue have ordered reimbursement in an amount meant to 
approximate what it actually cost the Government to 
represent the defendant.  See United States v. Stevenson, 
Criminal No. 10-120, 2012 WL 1038832, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 28, 2012) (ordering defendant represented by Federal 
Defenders to reimburse the clerk of court in an amount equal 
to “the costs of his representation by the Federal Public 
Defender’s Office”); Page, 2011 WL 2224674 (ordering 
defendant represented by CJA-appointed attorney to 
reimburse the clerk of court the amount that “was expended 
from the Treasury for CJA representation”); United States v. 
Bedoya, No. 89 CR. 803 (JMC), 1990 WL 194934, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1990) (ordering defendant represented by 
CJA-appointed attorney to reimburse the clerk of court in an 
amount equal to the “costs of legal fees expended for his 
defense under the [CJA]”).  Accordingly, I would remand the 
case to the District Court with instructions to reduce the 
amount of reimbursement to an amount approximate to what 
it cost the Federal Defenders to represent Konrad in this 
case.
2
   
                                              
2
 We would review the District Court’s calculation of this 
amount for an abuse of discretion.  I note that, while the 
Majority is correct to point out that the CJA rate is not an 
accurate accounting of the Federal Defenders representation 
costs (as the Federal Defenders receive a salary), district 
courts have used the CJA rate as an approximation for the 
cost of the Federal Defender.  See, e.g., United States v. 
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Meyer, No. CR-13-777-PHX-ROS, 2013 WL 3353771, at *4 
(D. Ariz. July 3, 2013) (ordering defendant represented by 
Federal Defender to reimburse clerk of court “at the current 
CJA hourly rate times the number of hours plus the costs of 
defense”). 
